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This paper provides a political economy model showing that when the ex-
change rate appreciates beyond an endogenously determined level, the trade-
able sector will feel compelled to bribe the government in exchange for pro-
tection. Interestingly enough, when the realization of the exchange rate is
above this endogenous threshold, the equilibrium will entail negative tariﬀs,
meaning goods are sold at prices below international levels.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Since Mundell’s (1961) classic paper, many authors have put a great deal
of eﬀort in the study of the costs and beneﬁts related to the formation of a
monetary union. Brieﬂy, the often cited gains are increased trade and cap-
ital ﬂows among member states, and enhanced anti-inﬂationary credibility
for those countries previously lacking it. On the costs side, the commonly
emphasized features are the loss of monetary autonomy when shocks hitting
diﬀerent jurisdictions are asymmetric, and the potential for conﬂict when
decisions on the course of monetary policy have to be made collectively1.
Adding to the beneﬁts list, Eichengreen (1993; 1998) presents a novel
and interesting argument, namely, that the stabilization in the real exchange
rate arising from the shared use of a unique currency may weaken national
lobbies’ willingness to campaign against trade liberalization. The political
economy argument is not diﬃcult to understand: when drastic appreciations
of the nominal (and real)2 exchange rate occur, inﬂicting huge losses to the
domestic tradeable sector, national lobbies will hastily enter the political
arena to pressure the country´s authorities for the adoption of counter-
vailling measures. If they are successful in their endeavor, a backlash on
import liberalization will then ensue. In Eichengreen´s own words: ”...sep-
arate national currencies, insofar as they make exchange rate variability an
unavoidable fact of economic life, are dangerously corrosive of the political
support for regional free trade”.
Indeed, anecdotal evidence seems to be supportive of this argument
As Eichengreen (1998) and Eichengreen and Ghironi (1996) report, anti-
liberalization sentiment gained momentum in the United States in 1995
when the Mexican Peso depreciated sharply against the Dollar and also in
many European countries in 1992, when both England and Italy left the
ERM and allowed their currencies to fall considerably against the Deutch
Mark3. Hence, for countries planning to liberalize trade (maybe through
the formation of a trade union), high exchange rate variability may prove
to be a diﬃcult obstacle in the way. Not that this volatility per se hinders
trade signiﬁcantly (say, due to higher transaction costs), but for the indirect
eﬀects it has on lobbies’ incentives to organize and take action.
1See, for instance, Alesina and Barro (2002) and Feldstein (1997).
2It is a well known fact that, because prices are sticky, shocks to the nominal exchange
rate translate almost entirely to the real exchange rate.
3A more recent example took place in Argentina in 1999, when Brazil left its currency
peg and allowed the Real to ﬂoat freely. The pressure exerted by the argentinean domestic
industry on their government to raise Mercosur’s intra import tariﬀs was immense.
1A ﬁrst objection to this line of reasoning would be that, under complete
markets, the tradeable sector could avoid huge losses in proﬁtability by
hedging itself against large drops in relative prices. Moreover, since lobbying
is not costless as it entails activities like advertising, sending representatives
to visit congressmen, ﬁnancing of politicians’ election campaigns and even
bribing public oﬃcials directly, it might indeed be optimal to buy hedge
instead. Unfortunately, though, markets are rarely complete and even when
there are ways to insure oneself against exchange rate variability hedging
can easily be more expensive than lobbying.
A second criticism to the political economy rationale here suggested
would go as follows: why don’t the beneﬁciaries of an exchange rate ap-
preciation, the generally larger nontradeable sector (or the population at
large, who earn wages in domestic currency) press the government in the
opposite direction, namely, not to raise tariﬀs? Our answer to this argu-
ment is simple and relies on Mancur Olson’s (1965) proposition that only
smaller, organized groups are capable of overcoming the free rider problem
and are thus able to raise the necessary funds to invest in lobbying. For
its part, the general public is too large and disperse and hence the beneﬁts
from confronting the tradeable lobby accruing to each individual are often
fairly small. As a consequence, it is quite reasonable to assume the general
public cannot eﬃciently counteract the organized tradable sector pressure
for protection.
Drawing on Eichengreen’s intuitive argument, the contribution of this
paper is to provide a coherent political economy model showing that when
the exchange rate appreciates beyond an endogenously deﬁned threshold, na-
tional lobbies will successfully press for positive taxation of imports, meaning
they will be able to sell their products at above market prices. The intuition
is that a government partially worried about social welfare, partially seek-
ing higher rents, will concede to lobbies’s demands for positive tariﬀs( w h i c h
hurt the general public) when the latter oﬀers them too high a compensation
in return.
The term “compensation” here does not necessarily mean sheer bribe,
though this may in fact be the case. One could also think, for example, in
legal ﬁnancing of campaigns or binding commitments by the tradeable sector
to vote for the politician in forthcoming elections. Interestingly enough, it
is shown that lobbies will ﬁnd it proﬁtable to oﬀer such compensations to
public oﬃcials only in situations of extremely unfavorable relative prices.
On the other hand, if the realization of the exchange rate turns out to
be favorable, lobbies will refrain from squandering their money trying to
please politicians. Moreover, because the government also cares about social
2welfare, it will grow increasingly reluctant to further hurt the general public
with tariﬀs when the domestic price of the tradeable good rises due to an
exchange rate depreciation.
The model laid down in the next section also presents the result that
for greater realizations of the exchange rate, optimal tariﬀs may indeed be
negative, this meaning prices below international levels. The idea is that it
will be more lucrative for the tradeable sector to accept a direct transfer
from the government in exchange for supplying the goods at lower prices.
In sum, the idea here is that when losses stemming from an unexpected
exchange rate appreciation are big and hedging is either expensive or nonex-
istent, the tradeable sector feels compelled to satisfy the government’s “par-
ticipation constraint” (through transfers) in return for greater protection.
Nevertheless, it is found that for higher levels of the exchange rate, lob-
bies will prefer to receive net transfers (subsidies) from the government in
exchange for lower prices.
2 The model
In this section, we provide a full-ﬂedged political economy model wherein
sharp exchange rate appreciations spark a protectionist backlash. There are
three key players in the model: the smaller tradeable sector which prefers
a devalued currency, the big nontradeable sector or general public that sees
its real wages soaring when the currency strenghtens, and the government
who cares about both sectors but also values potential transfers from the
organized lobby representing the interests of the tradeable sector.
2.1 Timing
The time schedule below describes the order events unfold in the model.
Timing
1. The tradeable sector chooses how much to produce (maximizing ex-
pected proﬁts) and hires capital accordingly.
2. The exchange rate becomes known to everyone.
33.The lobby approaches the government with a proposal for tariﬀsa n d
transfers (bribes). Following this meeting, the level of protection agreed is
revealed.
4. The public consumes tradeable and nontradeable goods.
Firstly, ﬁrms in the tradeable sector choose how much capital to hire in
order to maximize expected proﬁts (they do not know prices beforehand).
After that, a realization of the exchange rate is drawn from a previously
known distribution. The lobby then interacts with the government and a
decision on the level of protection is made. Finally, the public maximizes
its utility choosing how to allocate its income between the consumption of
tradeable and nontradeable goods.
2.2 The tradeable sector
We assume the tradeable sector’s production function employs only capital
and is expressed by y = kα. Another important assumption is the existence
of a time gap between capital installation and the production/selling of the
ﬁnal good. Assuming purchasing power parity (inclusive of tariﬀs) holds,
the price p of the tradable good equals (1 + τ).θ 4.C r u c i a l l y ,b yt h et i m e
it chooses the capital stock, the tradeable sector is not perfectly informed
about the exchange rate prevailing the moment goods are to be sold. In spite
of not knowing θ in advance, we assume ﬁrms do know this variable follows




Maximization of expected proﬁts, ΠE = θ.kα − r.k,5 thus yields the fol-
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stock is not adjustable in the short run (assuming liquidation costs are pro-
hibitively high), it is easy to see that actual proﬁts, when the exchange turns













4The foreign price of the tradeable good is normalized to zero to simplify algebra.
5The expected price of the tradeable good is equal to θ because: (i) E(θ)=θ and (ii)
the assumed form of the density function f(θ) will guarantee that expected tariﬀs( w h i c h
can actually be either positive or negative) will turn out to be zero. The intuition will
become clear later in the paper.
4The intuition in (1) is clear: when capital is sunk and has to be accu-
mulated before prices are revealed, huge losses occur if the exchange rate
appreciates too much and tariﬀs remain unchanged. As it will be shown
later, these unhedgeable appreciations of the exchange rate are precisely the
factor triggering lobbies’ desire for greater protection.
2.3 The general public/nontradeable sector
As it was mentioned in the introduction above, the general public will
not take part in the political process via lobbying. Nonetheless, because
they consume both nontradeables and tradeables the outcome of this pro-
cess will aﬀect them directly. More precisely, their budget constraint will
shift outwards when p decreases and inwards when it increases. For con-
creteness, the public is assumed to earn a nontradeable income of w and
to have logarithmic preferences in both goods. Its maximization problem is
therefore simply to decide how to allocate this nontradeable income between
the consumption of tradeables and nontradeables goods.
The public thus solves the following problem:
V ≡ MaxlogcN +l o gcT (2)
s.t : cN + p.cT = w
Where V is the indirect utility function of the general public and the
nontradeable prices are normalized to one. Substituting the ﬁrst order con-




) − logp. (3)
As expected, higher prices unequivocally damage those earning wages
in domestic currency. As it will become clear later in the paper, because
the government internalizes a variant of V in its own utility function, it will
end up resisting the lobbies when the exchange rate shrinks real wages too
harshly.
2.4 The government
In the model, the government cares about social welfare but also values
money rents. Moreover, we assume taxation not only means higher prices,
5but also entails deadweight losses. Due to this additional ineﬃciency, the
social concern of the government will be characterized by V G =2 .log(w
2 )−
(1 + τ).[log(1 + τ).θ], where the multiplicative term (1 + τ) is meant to
capture this extra cost of taxation.
Its utility function is hence given by:
U =[ β.Π + V G]+R (4)
Where:
β: is the relative importance the government ascribes to the tradeable
sector in social welfare;
Π: is the tradeable sector proﬁt;
V G : is the indirect utility function of the public at large inclusive of the
deadweight loss;
R : represents government rents, comprised by transfers, T, and wages,
wg.
The inclusion of the tradeable sector’s proﬁt in government’s utility func-
tion may reﬂect an objective of improving the current account (because ex-
ternal debt is too high, for example). The term in brackets in (4) hence
captures government’s concern with social welfare. However, the presence
of money rents in its utility function hints it will not behave like a purely
benevolent social planner when deciding τ jointly with the lobby.
2.5 Equilibrium taxes
For simplicity, we assume taxes are zero (τ =0 )in the status quo situation.
As indicated above, after nature draws some θ from f(θ), government and
lobby meet to decide whether taxes should remain where they are, turn
negative (meaning prices below international levels) or increase to positive
territory. The dynamics of this interaction involves the lobby approaching
the government with an optimal proposal for the pair (τ;T), denominated
(τ∗;T∗)6. Moreover, there is no real bargaining process in the model and
thus the proposal has to be either accepted or declined altogether by the
government
6It seems more realistic to assume the lobby approaches the government, and not the
other way around.
6The choice of the optimal proposal by the lobby comes from the max-
imization of the tradeable sector’s net proﬁt, Π(τ) − T 7.T h e i m p o r t a n t
restriction in this maximization problem is that the government be bet-
ter oﬀ accepting the proposal than rejecting it. To put it diﬀerently, the
government’s participation constraint has to be satisﬁed if it is to prefer the
proposal to the status quo. The lobby’s problem can be described as follows:
Max
{τ}
Π(τ) − T (5)
s.t : U(τ,T) ≥ U(τ =0 ,T =0 )
The nature of the tradeoﬀ implicit in the problem above is clear: the
need to satisfy the government’s participation constraint will imply higher
protection comes only at the cost of increased transfers. At (τ∗;T∗),t h e
marginal beneﬁt of proposing a greater τ (selling at higher prices) equals its
marginal cost (expending more resources with transfers).
Furthermore, because the lobby the proposer the constraint in (5) has
to be binding. The intuition is simple: there is no reason for the lobby to
spend more than the strictly necessary to bring the government into the























) − (1 + τ)log[(1+τ).θ]
i
+ wg + T
(7)
Imposing U(τ,T)=U(τ =0 ,T =0 ) , one gets to:
Tmin = τ.logθ +( 1+τ).log(1 + τ) − βγθτ (8)
Using equation (8),the lobby’s maximization problem simpliﬁes to:
7Obviously, a negative T means resources are being transferred from the government






.γ − (1 + τ).log(1 + τ) − τ.logθ + βγθτ
ª
(9)
The ﬁrst order condition of this problem yields the optimal value of τ
and is given by8:
log(1 + τ∗)=γθ(1 + β) − (1 + logθ) (10)
Substituting τ∗ back into (8) we are able to ﬁnd the minimal amount of
transfers needed to satisfy the government’s participation constraint.
Using these results, we establish the following propositions:
Proposition 1 Greater protection always comes at the cost of higher trans-




=( 1+l o gθ)+l o g ( 1+τ) − βγθ = γθ > 0.
Proposition 1 makes explicit the tradeoﬀ faced by the lobby when it ap-
proaches the government to ask for heightened protection: because higher
tariﬀs hurt the general public, the government will concede to lobby’s de-
mands only if the latter is willing to increase the amount of transfers.
Moreover, it becomes clear that positive tariﬀs will be enacted only when
the exchange rate strenghtens beyond an endogenously determined level.
This is the result stated in proposition 2 below:
Proposition 2 Given [(1 + β).γ] < 1, equilibrium tariﬀs will be positive
for low enough values of θ
¡
< θthr¢




a n dz e r ow h e nθ = θthr.
Proof. First, note τ ≶ 0 ⇐⇒ log(1 + τ) ≶ 0. This condition implies
τ ≶ 0 whenever γθ(1+β) ≶ (1+logθ). The graph below makes clear positive
tariﬀs are associated with extreme exchange rate appreciations and negative
tariﬀs with higher values of θ. In Region I, θ < θthr and τ > 0,whereas in
Region II we have θ > θthr and τ < 0.
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Proposition 2 above thus conﬁrms Eichengreen’s intuition put forth in
the introduction, namely, that economies facing high exchange rate vari-
ability (which imply a greater chance θ falls below θthr) are more likely to
witness a protectionist backlash. A corollary stemming from this proposi-
tion is that a monetary union irrevocably ﬁxing the exchange rate and hence
preventing wild gyrations in θ may be conducive to openness.
It is interesting to see in the graph above that an increase in the weigh
the government attaches to the tradeable sector, β, leads to a greater θthrand
therefore expands Region I where protection is in place (τ > 0). Note that
when γ(1 + β)θ is steeper than the 450 line, τ will always be positive.


















0 ⇔ θ < [γ(1 + β)]
−1 . Note this last inequality holds for the entire Region
I in the graph above.
Finally, a last caveat is in order: because in this paper we didn’t
intend to deal with the issue of time inconsistency, we assumed in section 2.1
the expected price of the tradeable good to be equal to θ. Note that because
E(p)=θ+ E(τ), to circumvent time inconsistency and have E(p)=θ we
9need to assume f(θ) is such that when “applied” to graph 1, it yields an
E(τ) equal to zero.
3 Conclusion
In sum, the model here presented provides a political economy mechanism
corroborating the intuitive argument that when the exchange rate appreci-
ates too much positive import tariﬀs will ensue. The results do not follow
from an ad hoc ﬁxed cost of lobbying, but from ﬁrst principles. More pre-
cisely, it derives from the necessity to satisfy a partially benevolent govern-
ment’s participation constraint.
In terms of policy recommendations, the paper lends credence to the
assertion that high exchange rate variability may hamper openness by en-
couraging lobbies to take action. Entering a monetary union may hence has
the additional beneﬁt of facilitating the opening of the economy.
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